MEASURING BEHAVIOR CHANGE
RESULTING FROM EORE AND THE
NEED FOR COMPLEMENTARY RISK
REDUCTION ACTIVITIES
By Helaine Boyd [ HALO ], Sebastian Kasack [ MAG ], and Noe Falk Nielsen [ NPA ]

FGD with a mixed community group in Olmun Village, Battambang Province, Cambodia. Good notetaking and facilitation are key.
Photo courtesy of © Sean Sutton/MAG.

R

isk education (RE) in mine action has been around since

of poverty, and/or insufficient clearance/ordnance disposal capacity.

1992.1 However, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)2

These circumstances lead to a lack of choices for persons living in or

operators are still struggling to measure how and whether

near an EO-contaminated environment to adopt safer behavior.

EORE has resulted in positive behavior change.3 Of course, various

This article presents a new approach to measuring behavior change,

monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methods have been pursued in

using a combination of qualitative and quantitative survey methods.

the past, predominantly the use of knowledge, attitude, practice, and
beliefs (KAPB) surveys; simpler pre-/post-EORE session surveys; the
use of proxy indicators such as number of explosive ordnance (EO)
accidents or victims; and number of explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) callouts from the community. However, these methods come
with some limitations in accurately capturing behavior change. For
example, survey questions linked to behavior would normally be prefaced as “what would you do if…” However, this self-reporting of behavior does not necessarily capture actual behaviors; moreover, responses
may be biased toward giving the “correct answer” in order to please

It is centered around conducting focus group discussions (FGDs)
pre-/post-EORE interventions at the community level. The approach
is showing positive results after an initial round of piloting and
implementation in ten countries (Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe)
for the past eighteen months, but it is not without its challenges.

REASONS FOR DEVELOPING THIS METHODOLOGY
The HALO Trust (HALO), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) are partnering together as part of
the UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) second

the organization conducting the survey. Further, research has evalu-

Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP2), which runs from 1 July

ated the limits of EORE in the context of ongoing conflict, high levels

2018 to 31 March 2021 and covers the ten countries listed previously.
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the Partnership felt that we had not
fully utilized FGDs in a comprehensive, rigorous manner to assess behavior change with respect to EORE. Key
questions included: How were we
going to produce a quantitative score
to a qualitative-heavy methodology? How will we capture EO-related
behavior of an entire community? We
realized that rolling out this methodology was not going to be easy and
would require additional training of
our in-country community outreach
teams (COTs)8 in order to capture the
nuance of varying behaviors and the
underlying motives across differing
sub-groups within communities.

DEVELOPING THE
METHODOLOGY
Core parameters were quite clear:
the COTs would conduct FGDs before
HALO staff conducting a focus group discussion with a mine-affected community in Anlong Veng District, Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of The HALO Trust.

While the “Partnership” had agreed on a standardized EORE pre-/
post-survey approach in GMAP1, we realized methods for systematically measuring behavior change, particularly at a community level,
were inadequate.4 Difficulties in measuring behavior change during
GMAP1 led the UK government to recommend the three organizations
to seek improved ways of measuring the effects of EORE. Itad, an external organization contracted to provide monitoring and evaluation of
the Partnership’s work under GMAP, had written a summative evaluation report for GMAP1 that recommended “to really deliver behavioral
change, better analysis is needed that leads to nuanced delivery of MRE.”5
From this, the Partnership developed the following indicator to
measure behavior change for the GMAP2 contract: “Percentage of
impacted communities surveyed reporting an increase in people who
behave in a safer manner (as a consequence of EORE).”
The Partnership began piloting a qualitative approach to measure
behavior change through FGDs as this methodology would (a) allow
for open discussions in small groups between five and twelve people to
ask follow-on questions and explore topics in-depth (b) be more representative of the community’s behavior rather than individual behavior, and (c) allow participants to report observed behaviors of other
community members, which would not be possible from a quantitative
KAPB survey. FGDs allow implementers to draw upon respondents’
attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences, and reactions in a group setting.6,7 By focusing on select age, social, and gender groups, FGDs can
create an atmosphere where people feel free to talk. Further, by having
a specific, thematic focus on behavior towards EO, this also provides a
concise parameter for discussion.
While mine action operators are used to conducting group interviews and FGDs in other areas related to humanitarian mine action,
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the delivery of EORE sessions in a
given community and then again

about three-to-six months after the EORE intervention.
As it was the first time that this outcome indicator was used in
DFID’s GMAP, there was an element of “piloting” M&E for this indicator in the first three months of the project. Following this baseline
phase, a lessons learned document was produced to catalogue all challenges and limitations in order to refine the methodology. The exercise determined that one FGD per community is not enough and if
possible, multiple FGDs should be conducted with distinct groups,
such as local leaders, women, youth, and/or specific risk-takers such as
shepherds. Country contexts are wide-ranging during conflict, postconflict, and in-development; and community acceptance of mine
action activities and participatory approaches can vary widely
depending on these circumstances. The capacity of our COTs also
varied significantly. Too many of our staff were used to asking suggested questions in a script-like fashion, and did not probe deeper; and
most importantly, they asked leading questions and judged participants’ answers. Initially, we had envisioned that the FGD methodology would have a sample size of 20 percent of all communities where
EORE is being conducted under the GMAP2 contract. However, it was
later found that for some countries this was an overwhelming burden
Examples of some of the open-ended questions include:
» What do you consider are safe behaviors towards EO?
» What are unsafe behaviors?
» What do you do when encountering explosive ordnance in
contaminated areas?
» What reasons, if any, prevent you from taking a safer approach
to the explosive ordnance threat?
There are approximately nine to ten questions asked in each FGD,
with the potential for numerous follow-up questions depending on
the responses given.

Scoring Matrix (on a scale of 1–5, 1 being very unsafe to 5 being very safe)
#

The FGD exhibits the following behaviors/overall assessment

Examples

1

FGD participants/community members are knowingly engaging in very unsafe activity/or it is
implied that this activity is still happening, despite no strong reason for economic necessity. (the
Reckless)
FGD participants/community members engage in unsafe behavior because they are mostly not
aware of the threat. Common belief that EO is not dangerous. (the Unaware)
No one, or very few members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively safe
behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)

• Refugees or IDPs in a conflict
affected country moving into
contaminated areas without any
knowledge of RE messaging
• Ex-military or young boys who
are reckless and refuse to believe
EO is dangerous
• Scrap metal collectors/explosive
harvesters

2

FGD participants/community members are aware of the threat, but do not know sufficiently how to
behave more safely. (the Uninformed)
FGD participants/community members knowingly use contaminated land (not applicable for
cluster strike areas) due to economic desperation, but may use well-trodden pathways while doing
so to avoid hazards. (the Forced)
Very few, or at least less than the majority of members in the community/FGD participants are
engaging in actively safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected
dangerous areas)

• Poor communities using the land
for cultivation out of desperation
• Women/vulnerable groups who
are isolated in rural communities
and do not receive adequate RE

3

A majority of FGD participants and other community members do not actively use the contaminated land; they seek safer areas for their livelihoods; unsafe behavior seems to be out of a misunderstanding of key RE messages or lack of trust of clearance response (i.e., moving an item to a tree or
landmark to avoid the item being in the pathway of someone else) (the Misinformed/Forced) or fear
(i.e., when an item is found, it is no longer picked up, but communities may not report to authorities
out of fear of retribution).
Half or a small majority of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively
safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)

4

FGD participants/community members do not report any unsafe behaviors, hazardous areas are
avoided, and people who did unsafe practices in the past have stopped doing so. A large majority
of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively safe behaviors (reporting
to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)

5

FGD participants/community members report mostly safe behaviors, and have actively and consistently reported items to authorities; they warn their children and newcomers about the threat.
All or at least a 90% majority of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in
actively safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous
areas)

• Communities with legacy
contamination who have been
living with mines for a long time
and have a well-established
reporting response mechanism
to authorities

Table 1. Scoring matrix (on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 is very unsafe, 5 is very safe).
Table courtesy of authors.

on COT planning and would threaten the delivery of EORE session

THE METHODOLOGY

targets in some cases. Jeopardizing the humanitarian objective of the

The FGD methodology allows for capturing qualitative information,

project was not an option. The sample size was thus redefined as “up to

which is imperative in measuring behavior change through a quantita-

20 percent of communities” to allow for some flexibility.

tive scoring process. COTs raise with the participants a series of core

Specific and comprehensive guidelines were developed following

topics, each with open-ended and follow-up questions, with the pur-

the lessons learned exercise. Notably, better guidance was needed to

pose of obtaining detailed information on behavior toward EO in the

properly train COTs. For example, finding the exact same participants

community. Examples of some of the open-ended questions include:

for post-EORE FGDs is no longer binding to allow for some flexibility

What do you consider are safe behaviors towards EO? What are unsafe

when gathering participants for the post-EORE FGD, as long as they

behaviors? What do you do when encountering EO in contaminated

had participated in the EORE session in the first place.

areas? What reasons, if any, prevent you from taking a safer approach

Analyzing the results of each FGD and then for the entire commu-

to the EO threat? There are approximately nine to ten questions asked

nity may possibly be the riskiest part of this approach. The reasons for

in each FGD, with the potential for numerous follow-up questions

ranking a community in relation to its behaviors toward EO must be

depending on the responses given.

well explained. The matrix itself along with the guidance will likely
need to be refined over time as more lessons are learned.

From there, the COTs record comprehensive notes of the FGD. These
notes are then immediately analyzed by the facilitator and note taker,
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State/
Region

Teams

FGDs

Shan

1

9

Kayin

2

12

Tanintharyi

2

36

TOTAL

5

57

1st Round Community Safety Score
1
1

2

3

4

3

3

3

2nd Round Community Safety Score
5

1

2

3

4

1

8

1

9

1

1

2

7

2

6

11

19

1

1

2

32

5

1

10

23

23

0

2

3

20

42

0

1.8%

17.5%

40.4%

40.4%

0.0%

3.5%

5.3%

17.5%

73.7%

0.0%

Table 2. MAG FGD analysis in Myanmar. Number and absolute scores of FGDs before and after conducting EORE.

State/
Region

Communities

Lower
Score

Same
Score

Higher
Score

Shan

9

0

3

6

Kayin

12

4

5

3

Tnintharyi

36

3

17

16

engaging in unsafe behaviors (Category 1), there has been a 12.2 per-

TOTAL

57

these communities (see Table 2).
Although there are still two communities that reported knowingly

7

25

25

cent decrease in the number of communities knowingly engaging in

44%

44%

unsafe behavior out of survival imperatives (Category 2), and a 22.9

with non-biased analysis provided by a senior member responsible for
community liaison and EORE. The person responsible for analyzing
the FGD data then produces a summary paragraph explaining the current state of behavior towards EO. This summary may include identifying the risk profiles of a community, with the understanding that
multiple risk profiles may be present in a community at any given time.
Risk profiles are broken down into five categories and can be ascribed
to individuals but also groups, ranging from Unaware, Uninformed,
9

SCORING SYSTEM
The scoring matrix ranks communities on a scale from one to five:
from a very high risk-taking community (#1) to one where a majority of
members in the community conduct safe behaviors related to EO (#5).
It is important to note that this scoring matrix comes with a number
of caveats that are detailed in the overarching FGD guidance document.10
Primarily, scoring of an FGD session should be done with the understanding of whether a majority or minority of community members
carry out safe or unsafe behaviors toward EO. We have termed this the
“none/some/all” approach to scoring. Further, the scoring of the postEORE FGD three-to-six months later should be mindful of the summary
paragraph from the pre-EORE FGD to see if the amount of community
members exhibiting unsafe behaviors has reduced since the EORE session. Without this general quantifying of community members, it will
become difficult to give a realistic score as it is quite likely for a commu-

percent decrease in the number of communities that report examples
of unsafe behavior stemming from ignorance or fear (Category 3). In
the second round of FGDs, 73.7 percent of targeted communities did
not report any unsafe behaviors but did not consistently report items
to authorities (Category 4), a 33.3 percent increase from the first round.
A surprising result showed 12 percent of targeted communities
received a lower score in the post-EORE FGDs than in the pre-EORE
FGD. In three out of seven of these villages, there were incidents
of community members engaging in risky behavior despite having received EORE. In one notable incident, a local pastor who had
received EORE was ploughing a field with a group of young men who
had not received EORE when they encountered an item of unexploded
ordnance (UXO). Instead of sharing key safety messages and warning them to not touch the item, the pastor played with the EO, throwing it to the other men he was with, as was reported in one FGD. The
remaining communities have a lower score in the post-EORE FGDs,
not because the communities are behaving in a more unsafe way
since they attended an EORE session but rather because the participants were not forthcoming in discussing risky behavior when MAG
Community Liaison teams conducted the pre-EORE FGD. A key lesson learned is that the data gathered in the first FGD might not always
be fully representative due to initial lack of trust. However, the FGD
process was invaluable in building relationships with the local communities, particularly in highly-militarized villages,11 and communities often participated more freely in the post-EORE FGDs. Being able
to directly address what the participants have been told in the FGDs
helps to make future EORE more tailored and hopefully for the mes-

nity to exhibit both safe and unsafe behaviors at the same time.

sages to sink in more. The process of having a discussion makes the

OUTCOMES: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES

they have different beliefs about what to do. This is helpful because

A positive outcome from using this methodology has been that it has
increased trust between affected groups and mine action operators in
communities, which has been significant in the context of Myanmar,
where conflict sensitivity is paramount.
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in three different States/Regions and post-EORE FGDs in fifty-seven of

12%

Table 3. MAG FGD analysis in Myanmar. Comparison between pre-EORE and postEORE FGD scores.

Misinformed, Reckless, to Forced.

Liaison staff conducted pre-EORE FGDs in eighty-three communities

community address the challenges together and understand whether
if unsafe practices are identified, then the elders can specifically take
ownership over not allowing this to happen in the future.
In Somaliland, seven out of the eight communities who have participated in both a pre-/post-EORE FGD conducted by HALO have

Talking about EO in Myanmar is still a very sensitive subject, even

reported positive behavior change, with only one exhibiting no change

in areas where there has been no fighting for years. MAG Community

in behavior. This particular community who did not exhibit more
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FGD conducted by NPA in the village of Kimunza Nzadi, Angola.
Photo courtesy of NPA.

positive behavior following EORE continued to report identified EO

Overall, the FGD methodology in Somaliland has proven to be

and spread awareness as they had done previously but struggled to

hugely successful. The notes produced from the FGDs illustrate that

convey key messages to nomadic populations. Further, while the FGD

communities have exhibited greater awareness of behavior towards EO

methodology can build trust in certain communities, it can also have

among community members, and that conducting the FGDs allows

the opposite effect in some contexts where communities exhibit survey

COTs to stay a bit longer, build trust, and has resulted in more people

fatigue. In some communities in Somaliland, people have been waiting

reporting items found or stockpiled at home. While the primary objec-

for clearance for almost twenty years and are frustrated that clearance

tive of the FGDs is to understand behavior change, they have proved

has not yet started in their community.

to be great centers of debate, and provide the COTs with valuable, con-

There are several FGDs that HALO in Somaliland did not end up
using for analysis because (a) the data was insufficient or (b) biased

textual information, which has then been used to tailor future EORE
sessions to specific groups and where it is most needed.

answers or leading questions were suspected. In these instances, the

In Cambodia, HALO has conducted 20 complete pre-/post-EORE

information is still used for qualitative purposes and future EORE

FGDs of which eleven communities have reported increased safer

project design, but the statistics are not included when reporting on

behavior. The challenge with ongoing EORE in Cambodia is that

the outcome indicator. As this methodology takes a lot more time

much like other legacy contamination countries, it is understood that

than other types of M&E methods due to the nuance required, it is

behaviors may not have changed for many years as some have adapted

important that all operators conduct continual monitoring and qual-

over time to risky or forced behavior because of the lack of alternative

ity assurance of the COTs to ensure that high-quality qualitative

options to livelihoods.

information is being collected for FGDs or confirm that the information is unusable for scoring.

In Zimbabwe, NPA is working mainly along the border with
Mozambique. The mines emplaced along this border impede the
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HALO FGD Analysis in Cambodia

HALO FGD Analysis in Somalia
Trapeang Ngeu

Qoryaale Bridge
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Siem

Libaaxle
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Figure 1. HALO FGD Analysis in Somalia.

Kantuot
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access of small scale and commercial farmers as well as timber companies to manage forestry.

Choam Trav
Chhngar Kandal
Anlong Ta Mok

NPA has applied the FGD methodology since 2018 with guarded

Anlong Koub

success. The FGDs have provided NPA with valuable information for

0

understanding the differences in vulnerability, roles, and needs of the
respective age groups, sex, and traits in the communities, allowing the

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Post-EORE FGD Score

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

Pre-EORE FGD Score

Figure 2. HALO FGD Analysis in Cambodia.

program to improve planning and EORE quality accordingly.
Despite the benefits of the approach, NPA has experienced a num-

something beyond mere advice on safer behavior. Structural causes

ber of challenges in the implementation. Large parts of the popula-

must be understood and addressed. As such, it is important to take

tion are seasonal workers, which makes it difficult to keep track of the

note of the lack of fully honest answers and stated answers versus actual

same group of people for between three and six months for the post

behavior change. NPA also noted that the rigidity of the scoring did

EORE FGD. In addition, working adults have shown limited interest

not allow for the program to report on subtle changes in stated behav-

in dedicating the required time for FGDs, making it difficult to ensure

ior resulting from the EORE sessions. As illustrated in Figure 3, three

representational participation.

out of seven communities showed positive changes in pre-/post-EORE

As for the actual discussions, NPA occasionally experienced that the

sessions. The program highlighted that even though the level of under-

community provided COTs with the “correct answers” while continu-

standing of the threat was raised, a majority of people within the com-

ing to practice unsafe behavior, e.g., cultivating crops in contaminated

munity continued to undertake unsafe, forced behavior, leaving the

areas for economic reasons. Thus, the method requires the building of

score unchanged. Thus, without proper explanation, the statistics will

sufficient trust to ensure the community is open to talk about its needs

convey a somewhat incomplete picture of the impact. However, this is

and reasons for undertaking unsafe behavior. Follow-up visits to con-

only a reporting issue. The FGD clearly showed that the program would

taminated areas to verify that the community follows its own stated

have to link in with other sectors to properly address the forced unsafe

behavior may be an option to validate FGD findings.

behavior as EORE in itself would not be a sufficient measure. Broader

Such cases illustrate yet again that the mine action sector needs to
work closely with other sectors, i.e., development NGOs, authorities,

reach of the FGDs, or discussions jointly undertaken with other sectors
could lead to a better understanding of the keys to change behavior.

etc., in order to ensure positive behavior change by offering people

EO RISK EDUCATION AND
EO RISK REDUCTION
People opt for dangerous behav-

Muzuru Village

ior when they see no other choice.

Ratelshoek Estate

For example, when sourcing drink-

Mandadzaka Village

ing water, gathering firewood, or

Mazundu Village

finding areas for hunting, these may

Foroma Village

only be reached by passing through

Marufu Village

a minefield, thereby knowingly putting their lives at risk to sustain

Muzite Village

their livelihoods. Children may not
0

0.5

1

1.5

2
Post

2.5
PRE

Figure 3. NPA FGD Analysis in Zimbabwe.
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3

3.5

4

4.5

5

know or simply forget safe behavior;
for instance when they stray playing
hide and seek, but this is something

that can be more easily addressed through EORE and attention from
well-informed parents, siblings, and friends.

Action point 30: “Prioritise people most at risk by linking mine
risk education and reduction programmes and messages directly

Some groups, like ex-combatants and those designated as “village

to an analysis of available casualty and contamination data, an

deminers” will often deliberately, recklessly take very high risks to

understanding of the affected population’s behaviour, risk pat-

enter hazardous areas to remove EO. They do this to support other

tern and coping mechanisms, and, wherever possible, anticipated

villagers or to make a bit of money. Farmers and shepherds come

population movements.”

across numerous items of EO in certain countries. Often, they decide

As highlighted previously, implementing risk reduction projects

to move the items themselves, motivated by protecting their children

will often be beyond the scope of mine action itself and require an

or their livestock. Why do they not report these EO items to the local

integrated approach. FGDs, as presented in this article, allow opera-

authorities instead of putting themselves at risk? Perhaps because the

tors to gain a better, context-specific understanding of affected com-

response takes too long, or out of fear of reprisal. FGDs help to find

munity’s needs as it relates to risk reduction. The population

answers to these questions and to explore more relevant and realistic

understands better who we are, why we are there, and what we can

suggestions to behavior change—suggestions that are community-

offer. As operators, we can use the information gathered from the

driven and context specific.

FGDs to improve our work by refining targeting, messaging, and

Other behavior proves even more challenging to address. For

identifying risk reduction alternatives.
See endnotes page 69

example when people keep EO with a profit motive in mind: children in Laos have sold cluster munitions so they have money to buy
ice cream; to harvest explosives for blast fishing (a very destructive
practice for the environment)12 or to blow up stones/rocks; to harvest
high-value metals from EO; or simply to use EO as construction material. How can we reduce the risks by persons who are either forced to
continue this behavior or see no reason why they should stop their
reckless behavior, often putting bystanders including family members
at unacceptable risk?
Effective risk reduction13 must go beyond “just” EORE and should
include options for safer alternatives to livelihoods in affected communities. For example, a safe playground may be built to reduce children
playing in unsafe areas, firewood as fuel can be reduced by 50 percent
when using fuel-saving stoves, and drilling a borehole may stop people
from going through the minefield to the river to collect water. These
alternative projects may be best placed in certain communities while
inappropriate in others, so context is key. Some mine action operators
may not have capacity to implement these projects directly, so partnering with wider relief and development organizations may be essential.
For the post-EORE FGD we added a question on why some behavior
did change or did not change for this exact reason.
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CONCLUSION
Using FGDs to measure behavior change has worked but has its limits when applied within a short timeframe of three-to-six months after
an intervention. Sustained behavior change will only manifest itself
over time and, therefore, must be planned and implemented beyond
any donor funding cycle.
The Oslo Action Plan, agreed upon at the fourth review conference
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in November 2019, aims to
steer the mine action community for the coming five years. It calls for
risk reduction in the context of EORE:
Action point 28: “Integrate mine risk education activities with
wider humanitarian, development, protection and education efforts,
as well as with ongoing survey, clearance and victim assistance activities to reduce the risk to the affected population and decrease their
need for risk-taking.”14
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